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Corruption peh hamara bhi haq hey 
(‘Corruption is also our right’)1 
 
Karachi with its population now estimated at over 21 million2 - by far the largest city 
in Pakistan – in many ways represents a microcosm of the country as a whole since 
virtually all of Pakistan’s so-called ‘ethnic’ groups and power brokers have come to 
be represented there in the years since 1947.  Accordingly, civil unrest in Karachi is 
regarded as an accurate indicator of the strength of the centrifugal tendencies existing 
inside multi-ethnic Pakistan:  its experience provides a stark account of the politics of 
‘ethnic’ identity that pervade Pakistani political life, and ‘ethnic nationalisms’ have 
figured prominently in the rhetoric emanating from the city.  As one commentator 
recently put it, ‘All is never really well in Karachi’.3  
 Karachi’s current woes, however, can be linked directly to the legacies of the 
way in which Pakistan came into existence.  In a nutshell, the demographic upheavals 
triggered by Partition meant that the province of Sindh more generally and Karachi in 
particular received huge numbers of migrants from what had become the Union of 
India in the wake of August 1947. As far as West Pakistan was concerned, compared 
                                                 
1
  Comment made by Sardar Abdul Qayyum Jatoi, PPP Federal Minister for Defence 
Production, who resigned in September 2010 after telling journalists that the Pakistani army 
was provided with funds to defend the country, rather than to become involved in political 
assassinations.  What is interesting - in relation to this topic under discussion here - is his 
remark about the place of corruption in Pakistani society, for at the same news conference, 
Jatoi suggested that the benefits of corruption should be equally available to all:  in his words, 
“All groups — Sindhi, Pakhtun, Baloch, Seraiki and Punjabi - should get an equal share in 
corruption”.  See http://tribune.com.pk/story/54478/minister-summoned-for-anti-army-
judiciary-remarks/ (accessed 10 April 2012). 
2
  Results in April 2012 of Pakistan's latest census initial tabulations showed that city 
had become home to over 21 million people, at a density of nearly 6,000 people per square 
kilometer (15,500 per square mile).  See http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-
13637-Sindh-population-surges-by-81.5-pc,-households-by-83.9-pc# (accessed 10 April 
2012). 
3
  See Arif Rafiq, ‘Politics, Karachi style’ 
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/22/politics_karachi_style (accessed 10 April 
2012). 
  
3 
 
 
with the Punjab, where communal violence at the time of Partition was much more 
intense and where the number of refugees moving in both directions was far greater, 
the experience of Sindh (and Karachi) may initially have seemed considerably less 
traumatic.  But what was significant in the longer run was that - unlike the Punjab 
where most of the incomers were themselves Punjabis albeit from further east - in 
Sindh the vast majority of refugees had little if any prior connection with this part of 
the subcontinent.  And in the following decades, little effective integration took place 
between the various communities drawn to Karachi, a situation further complicated 
by the internal migration of Punjabis and Pashtuns seeking employment further south.  
Sindhis, who even before independence were sensitive to the presence of outsiders in 
‘their’ province, experienced increasing marginalisation from sources of power, and 
increasingly associated Urdu-speaking refugees – or muhajirs – as well as other 
migrant communities with the priorities and plans of the country’s Punjabi-dominated 
federal authorities.  By the end of 1970s, around 50 per cent of the inhabitants of 
Karachi were Urdu-speakers, with a further 13 per cent speaking Punjabi.  Only 7 per 
cent spoke Sindhi (many of the city’s pre-Partition inhabitants had spoken Kuchchi, a 
language claimed as a dialect by both Gujarati and Sindhi).  By 1981 Urdu-speakers 
accounted for 61 per cent of Karachi’s population.  In many ways, Karachi’s ‘ethnic’ 
coordinates today represent a direct consequence of Partition’s long term impact on 
the city, something that very quickly after 1947 came to be reflected in the way that 
the city operated and functioned. 
 This article thus draws on archival records and contemporary newspaper 
reports to explore the early challenges posed by these changing demographic realities 
in Karachi in the decade following independence.  More specifically, it focuses on 
problems connected with policing the city, and the intense rivalry that developed 
between the Karachi Police and the Pakistan Special Police Establishment (set up in 
1948), which eventually resulted in the ousting from his post of the expatriate British 
Inspector-General of Police, Sir Gilbert Grace, in 1956 amid mutual accusations of 
malpractice and corruption.  While the vast majority of Karachi’s non-Muslim police 
officers had left for India by the beginning of the 1950s, a power struggle emerged 
between ‘refugee’ officers on the one hand and those from elsewhere in what had 
become West Pakistan on the other.  In effect, this competition between the various 
police establishments located within the city mirrored the wider manoeuvring for 
power and influence that was taking place as Pakistan’s new institutional structures 
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sought to accommodate the different sets of what were referred to as ‘provincial’ 
interests brought together since 1947, and the accompanying fluidity in the ranks of 
the government services was often blamed for what many perceived to be a rise in 
corrupt practices in Karachi at this time.  The backdrop to these rivalries also forms 
part of the bigger story of the political competition that was destabilising Pakistani 
politics more broadly in the late 1950s. 
 
Policing Sindh and Karachi 
 
Anyone seeking a potted introduction to the history of the police in the part of 
Pakistan where the city of Karachi is located inevitably turns first to the Gazetteer 
compiled by a former British official, H.T. Sorley, in the late 1950s.  While the Police 
Act of 1861 is regarded the principal legal instrument designed primarily keep 
imperial India’s subjects under check,4 Sindh’s police force, as outlined here, owed its 
colonial origins to the decision made by Sir Charles Napier after the British 
annexation of 1843 to establish a force numbering some 2,400 armed police under 
military officers, apparently quite independent of the civilian establishment.  It was 
modelled on an existing colonial institution – the Royal Irish Constabulary5 – and was 
commanded by an officer entitled ‘Captain [later Commandant] of Police’ under 
whom three Lieutenants (later Captains) of Police in turn controlled the three district 
forces of Karachi, Hyderabad and Shikarpur.  In 1865, immediate control of the police 
was devolved to the Commissioner-in-Sind, and district forces were placed under the 
command of Superintendants.  Eventually in 1905, the Commissioner’s supervision of 
practical day-to-day matters was transferred to a Deputy Inspector-General of Police 
for Sind, whose overall jurisdiction included Karachi.6   
                                                 
4
  International Crisis Group, Reforming Pakistan’s Police, Asia Report Nº 157 July 
2008, p. i.  Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-
asia/pakistan/157_reforming_pakistan_s_police.pdf (accessed 10 April 2012). 
5
  In modified form, this Irish model was then applied elsewhere in British India over 
the following twenty years.  See D. Arnold, ‘The Police and Colonial Control in South India’, 
Social Scientist, Vol. 4, No. 12 (July 1976), pp. 3-16. 
6
   H.T. Sorley (comp.), The Gazetteer of West Pakistan:  The Former Province of Sind 
(including Khairpur State) (Lahore:  Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, 1968), pp. 707-708.  
Sorley was a former ICS officer who had served as Collector or Deputy Commissioner of 
Hyderabad, Nawabshah (Sanghar included) Tharparkar and Jacobabad districts and who went 
to be a member of the Pakistan Central Board of Revenue in the early 1950s.  He was 
commissioned to produce this volume during the One Unit period - 1955-1969 - when the 
provinces making up West Pakistan were temporarily abolished. 
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 But, while the colonial era in Sindh was later often regarded a time of 
effective crime control, pre-1947 annual police reports and memoirs of individual 
officers indicate that the situation was not nearly as satisfactory as later imagined:  
‘despite all the efforts of the colonial government, Karachi, in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century was not a safe place’.7  In fact, the first half of the twentieth 
century has been recognised instead as a period of great difficulty from a police point 
of view,  ‘including as it did two world wars … the long period of depression and low 
prices in the twenties and thirties, and from the thirties onwards the great increase in 
the amount of political agitation and communal tension often resulting in serious 
outbreaks of disorder […] Occasional riots of serious dimensions occurred, for 
example at Karachi and Sukkur and the Hur Rebellion of 1942, and a great increase in 
police work was entitled by the Arms Act and Motor Vehicles Act’.8   
 Throughout these early decades, senior officers complained about the 
persistent failure of the government to provide sufficient police for duties, which had 
been made heavier as a result of post-(First World)war retrenchment and later on, 
among other factors, the great growth in population due to the Sukkur Barrage 
project, the inadequacy of police accommodation, and the increasing difficulty of 
securing the cooperation of the public especially after 1936 when, with the separation 
of Sindh from Bombay Presidency, day-to-day responsibility for government passed 
into the hands of local ministers, and local zamindars accordingly seemed less 
inclined to assist the police.9  Economic controls introduced during the Second World 
War added to the responsibilities of the police and further tested their discipline and 
integrity.  As a debate in the Sind Legislative Assembly in 1944 highlighted, the 
official impression on the eve of independence was that  
the policeman’s lot is not a happy one.  His pay is not commensurate 
with his labours.  [Indeed] a constable cannot live as a decent man 
with a paltry sum of Rs 37 per month, plus a small war allowance.  
The Police Department is the notoriously worst paid department 
under the Government of India.10 
 
                                                 
7
  A.H.K. Gorchani, The Sindh Police:  brief history and developments, 1947-1997 
(Karachi:  Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 28. 
8
  Sorley, Gazetteer, p. 710. 
9
  Sorley, Gazetteer, p. 710-711. 
10
  Official Report of the Sind Legislative Assembly, vol. XX, no. 3 (Karachi, 1945), pp. 
31-33. 
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 It was against this backdrop that independence took place, with considerable 
knock-on effects as far as the effective policing of Sindh, and the city of Karachi in 
particular, was concerned.  The confusion of Partition, which triggered enormous 
demographic upheaval and led to hundreds of thousands of people both leaving and 
entering the province during and after August 1947, challenged local police resources, 
not least in relation to the public integrity of the force:  as Sorley himself later 
commented, ‘it is feared that there has been some decline in the morale and honesty of 
the forces responsible for law and order, on account of the many temptations to which 
they have been subjected in the unsettled conditions that have prevailed for the last 
ten years’.11  Corruption, which had been acknowledged as a growing problem 
throughout British India during the war years when illegal activities surrounding 
supply, controls and rationing had intensified and provided increased opportunities for 
illicit gain, did not disappear after August 1947, but became a particularly sensitive 
issue, particularly when it involved those working on behalf of the new state.12  
Expectations that the new authorities would somehow address the problem 
successfully were high.13 
 The first attempt at reform took place in February 1948 when a bill for the 
establishment of a police force in Karachi was put forward.  Its aim was ‘to transform 
the police in Karachi from an instrument to keep citizens on a tight leash into a 
public-friendly agency staffed by professionals tasked with preventing and detecting 
crime and enforcing the law with justice and impartiality’.14  However, the move was 
in large part a response to weaknesses in the existing arrangements that had been 
                                                 
11
  Sorley, Gazetteer, p. 716. 
12
  W. Gould, T. Sherman and S. Ansari, ‘The flux of the matter:  loyalty, corruption and 
the everyday state in the post-partition government services of India and Pakistan’, Past and 
Present (forthcoming, 2013). 
13
  For a study that explores this issue from the point of view of the United Provinces 
both before and after independence, see W. Gould, Bureaucracy, Community and Influence in 
India:  society and the state, 1930s-1960s (London & New York:  Routledge, 2011), esp. 
Chapter 5.  For an overview of the place of corruption in early Pakistan, see I. Chattha, 
‘Competitions for Resources:  Partition’s Evacuee Property and the Sustenance of Corruption 
in Pakistan’, Modern Asian Studies, FirstView 2012: pp 1-30, 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8551698 
(accessed 7 May 2012).  
14
  M.S. Suddle, ‘Looking Back, Moving Forward:  a brief history of ideas and events 
relevant to Pakistan’s police system’, p. 42, in Report from the ADB Symposium on 
Challenges in Implementing Access to Justice Reforms (Asian Development Bank, 2005), 
available at http://www.adb.org/documents/reports/law-policy-reform/chap4.pdf (accessed 10 
April 2012). 
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exposed by a fairly rare outbreak of communal violence at the start of the year.15  As 
the Chief Minister of Sindh at the time, M.A. Khuhro, pointed out, the police force as 
it was then constituted had proved itself unable to cope with the enormous influx of 
people into the city, and, accordingly, he proposed the appointment of a 
Commissioner of Police for Karachi, along existing Bombay lines: 
Sir, the Bill is a long one, but most of it is already in operation in 
Bombay and other cities. Karachi has very much developed and 
many more people have come in. The population has considerably 
increased and the police force in the present conditions will not be 
able to cope up with the situation. Therefore, like Bombay, we are 
going to appoint Commissioner of Police for the city of Karachi and 
give him powers which are identical to those which are given to 
Police Commissioner of Bombay. This is the main idea behind it. 
The powers that he will enjoy are in respect of curfews, processions, 
public meetings, permission of these, regulating arms and licences. I 
think it is high time that Karachi city should have a Bill like this. 
There should be a regular Police Commissioner for this city.16 
 
The proposed police commissioner, however, would have no control over the city’s 
judges, who would remain under the authority of Karachi’s District Magistrate.   But 
while the bill was duly passed by the Sind Legislative Assembly, a combination of 
powerful vested interests (that allegedly prevented it from being presented to the 
ailing Governor General [Jinnah] for his authentication) and the change in Karachi’s 
status (when it became a federally-administered area later in 1948) meant that the 
proposal never came into effect.  According to Suddle,  
The Assembly passed the Bill on 7th February 1948 and an 
authenticated copy signed by the Speaker and bearing the forwarding 
note of the Governor of Sind was duly forwarded to the Governor 
General’s office. Surprisingly, the Legal Advisor to the Governor 
General made certain ‘minor corrections’ on the authenticated copy 
of the Bill, and returned it to the office of Governor Sind for 
resubmission. Why he did so is not clear from the record, but it 
appears that the politics of police reform did not let the Bill return to 
the Governor General, who because of his fast deteriorating health 
                                                 
15
  This was triggered by an attack on Sikhs passing through Karachi on 6 January 1948, 
carried out by refugees from India in apparent revenge for attacks on Muslims there.  See S. 
Ansari, Life After Partition:  migration, community and strife in Sindh, 1947-1962 (Karachi:  
Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 56-57. 
16
  For more details of the debate from which this quote is taken, see Sind Legislative 
Assembly Debates, 7 February 1948, vol. III, no. 4 (Karachi, 1948), pp. 49-51.    
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was increasingly unable to attend to official matters. (He died on 11 
September 1948).17    
 
 One of the interesting points that arose from the 1948 Sind Legislative 
Assembly debate, and something that became a recurring theme in discussions about 
the working of the police in Karachi in the years that followed, were apparent 
problems associated with the personnel involved.  Veteran Assembly member and 
longstanding representative of the city’s interests, H.M. Gazdar, for instance, pointed 
out how ‘unfortunate’ it was that ‘the police force in Karachi is not of the right type 
and most probably the new recruits who have come from areas which have suffered 
[migrants from India] are not quite suitable for Karachi’.  While the authorities had 
been trying to get the numbers increased, it was proving very difficult to train new 
policemen ‘overnight’.  As Gazdar admitted,  
I do not like this police … The best administration is that in every 
Department of Government there should not be one class or section 
dominating.  It is always good for administration that we should 
have a mixture.  We should have in the Police of Karachi Sindhis, 
Makranis, outsiders of various provinces, all a mixture.  Then alone 
we can be sure of proper administration in the city.18  
  
 Meanwhile, with increased concerns about the problem of corruption after 
partition, moves were made at both federal and provincial level to address the 
problem.  In 1947 a new Prevention of Corruption Act was passed, making the issue a 
special crime.  Its own investigating and prosecuting arm was subsequently created in 
1948 when the federally-controlled Special Police Establishment, which had been set 
up in 1942 during the Second World War to investigate rampant corruption in 
government departments was now (courtesy Ordinance VIII of 1948) renamed as 
Pakistan Special Police Establishment (PSPE): 
[T]he rationale for the institution of this body [the Special Police 
Establishment], which focussed specifically on government servant 
misconduct and corruption in all its forms, was the peculiar 
circumstances of the war. The outbreak of the war had brought about 
a vast increase in government activity especially in connection with 
government contracts, stores and railway transport, and had also 
                                                 
17
  See M.S. Suddle, ‘Reforming Pakistan Police:  an overview’, p. 99, available at 
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no60/ch05.pdf (accessed 10 April 2012). 
18
  Sind Legislative Assembly Debates, 10 February 1948, vol. III, no. 6 (Karachi, 1948), 
pp. 8, 14.   
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brought in its train numerous opportunities for “illegal 
gratification”.19  
 
With the passage of time, the PSPE, in addition to investigating charges of bribery 
and corruption against central government employees, was also given the power to 
look into cases relating to the 1923 Official Secret Act, the 1947 Foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act, 1947, the 1952 Passport Offenses Act, and the 1959 Customs Act.  
 But the anti-corruption measures that were set in place during the first decade 
after independence were not without their faults.  According to its later critics, an 
inherent flaw of the 1947 Anti-Corruption Act was that  
special permission [had to] be obtained from the departmental head 
of the concerned department/organisation to pursue a case and 
investigators had to inform the departmental head of the initiation of 
investigations.  This made prosecutions difficult as the investigators 
had to go through dubious bureaucratic procedures as well as 
causing unnecessary delays that provided time for offenders to take 
countermeasures that would undermine the investigation.  [Hence, 
although] the law was utilised successfully to prosecute offenders 
involved in minor cases, it effectively put the serious offenders and 
departmental graft beyond the effective ambit of the special police 
(that itself [sank] to one of the most corrupt institutions in 
Pakistan).20 
   
 Meanwhile the provincial authorities in Sindh also established their own 
provincial Anti-Corruption Department in June 1948.  Supported by his force of anti-
corruption police officers, wide powers were given to the province’s Anti-Corruption 
Commissioner in what was intended to bring about a thorough ‘clean-up’ of the Sindh 
administration.  These powers included suspending any officer belonging to any 
department on the charge of corruption, as well as ordering departmental inquiries 
when and where necessary.  The Sindh authorities were supposed to consult with their 
Commissioner when making appointments and confirming or promoting officers:  
                                                 
19
  See Gould, Bureaucracy, Community and Influence in India, p. 111. 
20
  M. Khan, N.A. Shah Kakakhel and M.J. Dubnick, ‘Prosecuting Corruption:  the case 
of Pakistan’ (paper presented at the 2004 Ethnics Forum, American Society for Public 
Administration) pp. 5-6.  The law declared criminal misconduct (defined as the ‘obtaining of 
any gratification as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official Act’) as an 
offence punishable with seven years rigorous imprisonment.  In addition, the law also made a 
crime of accepting anything valuable from a person having business related to an official’s 
functions or the official abuse of his position for the purpose of obtaining anything of value .  
See http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN019113.pdf 
(accessed 10 April 2012).   
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‘The fate of the corrupt is doomed’, observed one Sind Secretariat official, who 
warned (rather over-optimistically perhaps) that anyone with a skeleton in their 
cupboard would be brought to book for their old habits.21  But by August 1949, while 
more than two hundred cases of bribery and corruption had been registered against 
provincial officials, only seventeen people had actually been convicted though other 
cases were still pending in the courts and several hundred officials had been 
suspended as a result of the provincial anti-corruption drive, including an Inspector-
General of Prisons (who was later discharged from service) among their ranks.22  In 
October the Sindh Chief Minister issued orders to all the district authorities to apply 
the Safety Act against corrupt officials, with district collectors instructed to prepare 
lists of those officials whose standard of living appeared to be higher than their 
salary.23  Later, in June 1953, a similar anti-corruption drive was made at the federal 
level, when the ‘Civil Service (Prevention of Corruption) Rules’ were published.  
Now any government servant who was proved, or ‘reasonably believed’ to be corrupt, 
could be dismissed or compulsorily retired.  Under these Rules, a person could be 
‘reasonably believed’ to be corrupt if he had a reputation for being corrupt, if he, his 
dependents or his associates through him, were in possession of pecuniary resources 
disproportionate to his known income, or if he had assumed a standard of living above 
his means.  The development was generally welcomed by press and public alike, 
though with some scepticism about how far it would be possible to implement the 
Rules.  As the pro-refugee newspaper Dawn, published from Karachi, put it, ‘The 
“living-within-means” look which has suddenly become visible in some “quarters” is 
certainly not the result of any “austerity drive”’.24    
  
Police rivalries in Karachi 
 
Crime more generally (from murder to cycle theft - the latter a big problem in post-
partition Karachi according to contemporary newspaper reports), and how it was 
addressed, was an issue that generated much public discussion – and disquiet – in the 
early years following Pakistan’s creation.  Hence, what was perceived by the public as 
                                                 
21
  Dawn, 30 May 1948.   
22
  Dawn, 11 August 1949.   
23
  Dawn, 27 October 1950. 
24
  Cited in Pakistan Fortnightly Summary, Part II, 26 May-8 June 1953, DO 35/5284, 
United Kingdom National Archives (henceforth UKNA). 
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a tendency towards complacency in some official quarters, despite rising crime 
figures in the city, became the subject of especial criticism.  By the beginning of 
January 1951, the authorities could not afford to ignore the problem any longer and 
the Pakistan Ministry of the Interior accordingly deputed two ‘up-country’ officials to 
recommend changes.  Gilbert Grace, Inspector-General of NWFP,25 and the Chief 
Commissioner for Lahore, Akhtar Hussain, were given just five weeks to produce a 
blue-print for improving the federal capital’s police administration.  The stated object 
was to expand the metropolitan police force and make it more effective in its efforts 
to preserve law and order in the city.  As one newspaper report put it,  
Busy in heaps of files and police manuals Mr Grace, who has five 
weeks at his disposal, said that though the problems confronting a 
huge city like Karachi were ‘foreign’ to him, he was confident of 
tackling it successfully.  The Inspector General is examining the 
various forms of administration existing elsewhere and is finding out 
the best one suited for the conditions in Karachi.26 
 
 The immediate outcome of their investigation, however, was not clear-cut.  Its 
major finding that corruption was rife within the force can have come as little surprise 
to either Karachi’s inhabitants or the authorities themselves.  Grace himself was then 
appointed Inspector-General of Police for the city in August 1951, and once in this 
position launched his own highly personal campaign to eradicate corruption among 
both officers and the rank and file.  One of the matters of concern that he identified 
after taking up his post was a feature that he regarded as peculiar to Karachi – that 
various government officials in ministries and particularly in the Ministry of the 
Interior and in the Chief Commissioner’s Secretariat were communicating directly 
with police stations and seemingly interfering in case work, either on account of 
personal interests or from what he regarded as corrupt motives.  Grace at once issued 
an order to police stations forbidding this interference and directing that all such cases 
                                                 
25
  Sir (Oliver) Gilbert Grace, C.I.E., O.B.E., born Tring, Hertfordshire, 1896; educated 
at Berkhamstead School; Commissioned 2nd Lieutenant, 4th (Territorial) Battalion, Yorkshire 
Regiment (Green Howards), 7.6.1915; Promoted Lieutenant, 1.6.1916; Staff Captain and 
Brigade Major, 189th Infantry Brigade; served in the 3rd Afghan War, 1919, and was 
Mentioned in Despatches; Entered Indian Police, 1920; Commandant, North West Frontier 
Constabulary, 1937-47; present in the Ahmedzai Salient operations, and was Mentioned in 
Despatches, 1940;  Inspector-General of Police, North West Frontier Province, Pakistan, 
1947-51; Inspector-General of Police, Karachi, Pakistan, 1951-56; knighted by Her Majesty 
the Queen at Buckingham Palace, 20.10.1953 (London Gazette 1.6.1953). Sir Gilbert Grace 
died on 23.1.1968. See http://www.spink.com/auctions/pdf/7022.pdf, p. 17 (accessed 10 April 
2012). 
26
  Dawn, 6 January 1951. 
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should be reported directly to him, as well as through the usual channels.  He also 
found that subordinates in the Ministry were receiving a range of complaints (many of 
them anonymous) addressed to the Minister (who was supposedly quite unaware of 
them) and then sending them on as from the Government of Pakistan for immediate 
action and report.  Grace’s own refusal to report on such matters as were in the 
competence of himself or of his subordinates to deal with, stopped a lot of what he 
regarded as ‘this mischief, nepotism and income’, and so was disliked by those 
issuing the orders.27   
 What went down even worse was his decision in 1952 to dismiss a number of 
those police officers whom he had identified as corrupt.  This move was made all the 
more controversial by the fact that it seemed, in some eyes, to target police officers 
who had migrated from India at or after Partition.  Back in 1948 when Karachi was 
separated from Sindh, and became Pakistan’s Federal Capital, some 3,500 displaced 
officers and men were enlisted to augment the city’s forces.  In the upper ranks 
(inspector and sub-inspector), they represented around 75 per cent of the total 
strength.  However, since the records of these new enlistments were apparently not 
available from India, a number of so-called ‘imposters’ were suspected as having 
crept in.  As Grace himself later explained, 
Most of these officers were destitute, having been stripped of their 
possessions before entering Pakistan.  They were accompanied not 
only by their wives and families, but destitute parents, brothers, 
sisters and their families also had to be supported, and there was a 
resultant temptation to resort to corrupt practices to augment their 
meagre pay.28   
 
Accordingly, in May 1952, Grace dismissed with ‘ignominy’ 27 subordinate officers 
in front of a parade of the whole city Force on the grounds of corruption – they were 
charged with taking weekly payments from a drugs pedlar in return for him selling 
charas29 openly in one of Karachi’s main markets.  Then in December 1952, upon 
receiving reports from Superintendants of Police, a further 20 inspectors and sub-
inspectors were suspended on the grounds of their ‘incorrigible corruption and 
degraded standards of work’.30  The majority of these men were again former 
                                                 
27
  ‘For the Information of the President of Pakistan only’, pp. 3-5, DO 35/8934, UKNA. 
28
  ‘For the Information of the President of Pakistan only’, p. 3. 
29
  Cigarettes combining hashish with tobacco leaves. 
30
  ‘For the Information of the President of Pakistan only’, p. 3. 
  
13 
 
 
refugees, chiefly from what had been the United Provinces (UP) in India.  Their 
dismissal was carried out by a simple order of discharge without any formal 
proceedings, as Grace had apparently been advised by the Ministry of Law that, 
because they were on temporary one-year contracts, ‘show cause’ notices did not need 
to be given.31   
 What Grace failed to appreciate, despite his familiarity with the day-to-day 
realities of life in Pakistan, was the extent to which many of these dismissed police 
officers had the advantage of friends in so-called high places – influential contacts in 
various ministries and amongst refugee politicians – and consequently his actions 
came under immediate fire for being ‘anti-refugee’ and biased in favour of men from 
the Punjab and NWFP.32  Nearly all of the magistrates and most of the Pakistan 
Special Police Establishment, maintained by the federal government to enquire into 
corruption in the Central Services, hailed from the UP, while the Karachi Police and 
CID had, in the view of their supporters, reportedly been ‘kept free of provincialism’ 
but all the same contained a high preponderance of men from the Punjab and NWFP.  
Grace’s defenders, in response to accusations levelled against him, argued that he did 
not promote his favourites unfairly or overstock his force with men from other parts 
of Pakistan.  On the contrary, in their view, he had done no more than attempt roughly 
to balance by ‘impartial’ means what they regarded as the excessive recruitment of 
‘U.P.-wallahs’ that dated back to supposed efforts by former Prime Minister Liaqat 
Ali Khan to build up an electoral college for himself in Karachi.33  Appeals against 
the officers’ dismissals went first to the Chief Court, and then, thanks to the co-
operation of a Deputy Registrar deemed by some contemporaries (though not proven) 
to be in the pay of the dismissed officers, found their way to an allegedly sympathetic 
judge who quashed the order.  But on appeal to a full bench, this judgement was 
reversed, and Grace’s actions upheld.   
 As these developments confirm, Karachi in the 1950s was a veritable ‘nest of 
provincial intrigue’.  Thereafter, the conflict between Grace and refugee interests 
present in the Karachi force itself became still more complex and embittered.  In 
October 1954, when Grace’s own three-year contract had been due to expire, he was 
                                                 
31
  ‘For the Information of the President of Pakistan only’, p. 4. 
32
  ‘For the Information of the President of Pakistan only’, p. 4. 
33
  UK High Commission, Karachi, to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 22 
August 1956, DO 35/5407, UKNA. 
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asked by the Pakistan Government (he was close to President Iskander Mirza from his 
NWFP service days34) to stay on for a further two years in order to complete his 
scheme to put the police in Karachi on a sounder footing.  Some 15 inspectors and 
sub-inspectors, whom he regarded as a similar liability to the others who had been 
dismissed earlier, then combined forces with those already discharged and prepared a 
lengthy petition that was highly critical, if not defamatory, of Grace and other senior 
officers.  Their aim, it would seem, was to turn key politicians and government 
officials against the Inspector-General, and so prevent the extension of his duty.  
Grace at the time was on leave in the UK, but in his absence the Karachi CID (still 
staffed mostly by personnel from the Punjab and NWFP) traced not just the authors of 
the application but apparently also the actual typewriter and typist involved in 
producing the petition papers.   
 In addition, CID officers made use of the Security Act to arrest a petty 
criminal – MA – who had earlier been declared a ‘Disorderly Person’ and expelled for 
one year from Karachi by the city’s Chief Commissioner on CID evidence.  MA now 
retaliated with a full statement regarding what he alleged had been a police conspiracy 
together with the various rendezvous used by the officers concerned, but following a 
habeas corpus petition by his wife he was released on the grounds that, as a Security 
prisoner, he should not have remained in police custody but instead should have been 
committed to jail.  Not surprisingly, once released, and back with the suspended and 
discharged officers, MA in turn launched what Grace’s supporters regarded as a set of 
vexatious petitions that included charges of torture and murder levelled against the 
Deputy Superintendant in charge of the Karachi CID at the time, and an accusation 
against another CID Inspector that he had committed an “unnatural offence” on MA 
some months earlier.  In Grace’s opinion, both colleagues were victims of vindictive 
action instigated by UP officers.  The CID Deputy Superintendant (a Punjabi), Grace 
pointed out, could claim over 20 years of distinguished service, including his 
appointment as Inspector-General for Anti-Corruption by the pre-1947 Government 
of India in connection with war contracts.  The accusation against the other officer 
was similarly “fantastic”:  in Grace’s words, 
                                                 
34
  Both Grace and Mirza had received an OBE in January 1945, Grace for his work as 
Commandant in Frontier Constabulary, and Mirza as Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, 
North-West Frontier Province.  See http://www.london-
gazette.co.uk/issues/36866/supplements/7/page.pdf (accessed 10 April 2012). 
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MA is a repulsive looking pimp, aged 45.  The Inspector is a married man with 
two wives and ten children in residence, and with no homosexual tendencies 
[…] the complaint was blatantly false and intended only as harassment.35 
 
The immediate outcome was the dismissal from service of those 15 officers who had 
backed MA.  They then in turn appealed to the Karachi Bench of the West Pakistan 
Court, whose two members – the Chief Justice and the afore-mentioned sympathetic 
judge – after two days of hearings in December 1955 agreed to disagree, the former 
upholding the order of discharge, the latter holding the opposite view.  The case was 
then referred to yet another Bench with different judges, the case heard in February-
March 1956, and the judgement again postponed.  It was not until August 1956 that 
judgement was finally pronounced in favour of the appellants, some of whom were 
then re-employed by the PSPE, underlining the divisions and dynamics at work in the 
city’s police forces.36   
 In the meantime, the intra-police ‘feuding’ had continued apace.  In January 
1956, Grace’s deputy, Masood Mahmood (another Punjabi), successfully investigated 
a serious theft from the Naval Establishment, resulting in the public disgrace of two 
senior naval officers, who had both migrated to Pakistan from the UP.  Then in June, 
a magistrate with UP origins was likewise arrested on charges of embezzlement from 
his Court.  In response, local magistrates en masse then formed a ‘Union’ with the 
City Magistrate as president, apparently ‘declaring war’ on the Karachi Police.  
Grace’s opponents now seemingly comprised the UP ‘clique’ in the police and the 
magistracy.  In his absence (Grace was ‘up-country’ at the time), Mahmood wrote to 
the District Magistrate accusing his colleagues of collectively obstructing the work of 
the police.  Shortly afterwards Mahmood was removed from office.  That same night 
(7 July) Grace was recalled to Karachi.37 
 At this stage, the Inspector-General’s opponents produced two trump cards, 
which put pressure on Grace but also clearly underlined the provincial tensions 
operating at different levels within city life.  The first was the case of a police suspect 
– one Noor Muhammad Memon – who, according to the official account, had 
committed suicide by jumping from the top (third) floor of the police headquarters on 
                                                 
35
  ‘For the Information of the President of Pakistan only’, p. 7. 
36
  ‘For the Information of the President of Pakistan only’, p. 9. 
37
  Ibid., p. 17. 
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the night of 30 June/1 July.38  The body, with the assistance of the magistrates’ 
‘Union’, was taken by Noor’s mother on 2 July in procession to the house of acting 
Prime Minister, I.I. Chundrigar, and allegations of death by police torture were 
made.39  In the ensuing enquiry, the District Magistrate forbad the presence of any 
police officer in his court, and finally it was the PSPE (that is, the Federal rather than 
City police) that was authorised to undertake the investigation.  This, in the view of 
the PSPE’s critics, triggered a virtual reign of terror aimed at those members of the 
Karachi Police who remained loyal to Grace:  ‘the whole [of the Force] became 
demoralised.  Official work almost came to a standstill.  In police stations the main 
topic of conversation daily was “Who has been arrested today?” “Whose turn is it 
tonight?”’.40  Officers and men were picked up at all hours of the day and night, and 
eventually on 24 July nine police officers were formally arrested on charges of 
murder, causing grievous bodily hurt to extort confession, wrongful confinement, and 
suppression of evidence.  Within a couple of days the Ministry of the Interior had 
published a much wider notification to the effect that the PSPE had been authorised to 
investigate all charges received from the public against the Karachi Police.41   
 Grace himself confessed to being amazed at the turn that events had taken.  
Setting the PSPE against the Karachi Police, it seemed, had started a feud whose 
repercussions, he predicted, would be felt for many years to come.  Another piece of 
‘criminal folly’, he argued, was the sharp cleavage between refugee elements and 
West Pakistanis (those hailing from the Punjab and NWFP) produced by the way in 
which particular officers had been selected from the Karachi Police to assist the 
PSPE:  ‘This offended against all the principles I stood for, as I have never tolerated 
provincialism in the Force and its introduction was fatal to esprit de corps and 
morale’.42  Grace himself received orders from the Chief Commissioner to remove or 
suspend key personnel.  In the final event, however, one of the Superintendants of 
Police whom Grace had earlier removed on charges of corruption and malpractice 
                                                 
38
  UK High Commission, Karachi, to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 13 
August 1954, D) 35/5407, UKNA.   
39
  The public reaction to the circumstances involved in the death of Noor Muhammad 
Memon, an ice-cream seller, petty hoodlum and refugee, underlined the general hardening of 
community distinctions taking place in Karachi during this period.  See Ansari, Life After 
Partition, p. 165. 
40
  ‘For the Information of the President of Pakistan only’, p. 28. 
41
  UK High Commission, Karachi, to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 13 
August 1954, DO 35/5407, UKNA 
42
  ‘For the Information of the President of Pakistan only’, p. 28 
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was not just reinstated but made head of the CID, while the group of officers whom 
he had discharged in 1952 were similarly reprieved though now posted to the CID 
rather than returning to the Karachi Police.  The aim of these manoeuvres, he 
believed, were clearly intended to make his position so untenable that he would have 
no alternative but to resign. 
 The second trump card, about which the city’s newspapers made great play, 
was an allegation that the Karachi CID was illegally tapping the telephones of 
ministers.  On 9 July a party that included the acting Minister of the Interior Nurul 
Haq Chaudhry, the City Magistrate and M.A. Zuberi, the well-known Dawn 
journalist,43 raided the CID offices and demanded a list of those telephones being 
tapped.  On 13 July, while Grace was meeting President Iskander Mirza to discuss his 
position, his own office was personally searched by the Chief Commissioner who 
reportedly removed monitoring apparatus and a number of top secret files.  Despite 
subsequent meetings between Grace and the Prime Minister, Chaudhry Mohammed 
Ali (now back from a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in London, and 
performing Hajj), with the latter telling Grace to stand firm and that steps would be 
taken to remedy matters, the situation only worsened from Grace’s point of view as 
the Prime Minister himself came under increased criticism from the many of the same 
disgruntled pro-refugee sources.  Following a leak from the Ministry of the Interior 
on 8 August that the Government had now called off the investigation by the PSPE 
and instead entrusted the conduct of the inquiry to Grace himself, there was a huge 
outcry in the city.  The next day, a public meeting was called by anti-Grace elements 
in the Karachi force, complaining at his role.  Within 24 hours, three policemen were 
picked up by the PSPE and allegedly threatened with arrest unless they implicated the 
Inspector-General.  There were also rumours of a planned disturbance at the 
forthcoming Independence Day celebrations, at which the Prime Minister would be 
insulted and Grace’s impeachment demanded.44  For Grace’s supporters, these moves 
were orchestrated to ‘hamstring the activities of the Karachi Police and [they] led 
                                                 
43
  Dawn was a leading English-language newspaper (established by Jinnah in Delhi 
before independence) produced in Karachi that projected itself as a ‘national’ publication 
while closely identifying with the ‘refugee cause’ – it was closely associated with the Muslim 
League during this period. 
44
  In what was regarded as one of the longest leading articles ever published by the 
newspaper, Dawn attacked Grace, claiming that any government that retained him in its 
employ for 24 hours after this judgement would be answerable to God and man.  ‘For the 
Information of the President of Pakistan only’, p. 31. 
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directly to the ultimatum to the Prime Minister which decided him to sacrifice 
Grace’.45 
 This combination of pressures proved to be the breaking point.  The Prime 
Minister evidently decided that his government could no longer support Grace, 
whether or not the latter enjoyed the confidence of the President.46  Grace was told 
that the Government no longer wanted to impose upon him the ‘mental torture’ that 
he had been suffering over the previous two weeks and he should ask for indefinite 
leave.47  It was made clear to him that the Government felt that unless he went, its 
own position would be very seriously compromised.  The Civil Surgeon duly certified 
that Grace was suffering from a nervous breakdown, and he was given permission by 
the Chief Commissioner to proceed to the UK.  Even so, on 14 August an 
Independence Day procession of about 2,000 people went to the Prime Minister’s 
house, calling for Grace’s arrest,48 and delaying tactics were adopted to prevent him 
from obtaining the necessary Income Tax Clearance Certificate without which he 
could not leave Pakistan – according to a subsequent statement by Grace, Income Tax 
staff had stated plainly that they were not going to provide this certificate because he 
was to be brought to trial and so should not be allowed to leave the country.49  Only 
the personal intervention of the Finance Minister, Syed Amjad Ali, meant that the 
certificate was obtained just before the relevant office closed on 16 August for the 
Muharram holidays.  Grace eventually departed for the UK some five days later to the 
sound of a police pipe band playing ‘For he’s a jolly good fellow’ at Karachi 
airport.50  In the meantime, on 8 August  
                                                 
45
  UK High Commission, Karachi, to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 22 
August 1956, DO 35/5407, UKNA. 
46
  Iskander Mirza’s assessment of Grace was that he ‘was a bad judge of men and had 
made mistakes.  But he had done great things for the Karachi police force’.  ‘Pakistan 
political situation’, 17 August 1956, DO 35/5407, UKNA. 
47
  UK High Commission, Karachi, to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 17 
August 1956, DO 35/5407, UKNA. 
48
  The Times (London), 16 August 1956. 
49
  Apparently, on the night of this demonstration, a special police guard was sent to his 
hotel in case the crowd should turn violent against him.  UK High Commission, Karachi, to 
Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 17 August 1956, DO 35/5407, UKNA  
50
  It would appear that Grace’s successor as Inspector-General of Police of the city (who 
was also appointed head of the Special Police) arranged for Grace to be given a proper send-
off when he left Karachi – at the airport the police pipe band played ‘For he’s jolly good 
fellow’ continually for more than twenty minutes.  UK High Commission, Karachi, to 
Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 22 August 1956, DO 35/5407, UKNA.  
Interestingly, Grace’s departure coincided with the resignation of Sir Thomas Ellis who had 
produced a report on corruption among government servants in March 1956 and in the 
  
19 
 
 
a Full Bench of the West Pakistan High Court sitting in Karachi 
allowed the writ petition of five officers of the Karachi police, 
quashed the order of their dismissal by IG, Sir Oliver Gilbert Grace 
in July last, and ordered their reinstatement in the posts from which 
they were dismissed.51 
 
 
Competing for political advantage 
  
This story of intrigue within the police establishment in 1950s Karachi highlights the 
extent to which loyalties and rivalries operated within the post-Partition services in 
Pakistan, and how far they fused with accusations and counter-accusations of bias and 
corruption.  Undoubtedly there was intense competition between different sets of 
interests that seemed to be directly linked to so-called ‘provincial’ identities.  
Karachi’s police establishment – in its various ‘local’ guises – replicated these 
closely.  Refugee representation – and that of those from the UP in particular – in the 
administration of the federal capital of Karachi was undeniable:  by the mid-1950s, 
the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Assistant Secretaries in the Ministry of the 
Interior, among others, all shared a UP background.  But while Grace identified UP 
migrants as the main challenge to his authority, it would seem that the reality was 
actually more complicated.  Attacks on the Karachi Police in 1956 were regarded by 
contemporaries as part of a bigger ‘conspiracy’ then taking place to unseat the Prime 
Minister, himself from Jalandhar in East Punjab, being mounted by a combination of 
refugee (UP) but also East Pakistani (that is, Bengali) interests, and which eventually 
bore fruit when Chaudhry’s government collapsed and he resigned in September the 
same year.   
 Indeed, it is the Bengali dimension that interestingly complicates the whole 
scenario, as closer inspection of available records also reveals attempts at this time to 
                                                                                                                                            
process of investigating charges against the Karachi Custodian of Evacuee Property that was 
being blocked by influential people within the Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation.  See 
UK High Commission, Karachi, to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 18 August 
1956, DO 35/5407, UKNA.  British officials accordingly drew the conclusion that it was no 
longer advisable for foreigners to occupy executive positions in Pakistan.  UK High 
Commission, Karachi, to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 22 August 1956, DO 
35/5407, UKNA.  
51
  An impassioned leader published in Dawn on 9 August was headed ‘In the name of 
justice’, and ended by claiming that ‘any Government which retains Sir Gilbert Grace for 
even twenty-four hours will stand eternally disgraced in the eyes of man and condemned in 
the eyes of God’. 
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increase the number of Bengalis employed in the police in Karachi alongside the 
apparent efforts on the part of UP refugees to protect and enhance their position vis-à-
vis other so-called ‘provincial’ interests. It had been a feature of the final National 
Assembly session of the Chaudhry Muhammad Ali premiership (that is, before events 
involving Grace and the Karachi Police came to a head in the summer of 1956) that 
question hour was taken up in large part by requests for information regarding the 
number of appointments held by East Pakistanis and how many by others in posts 
controlled by the Federal Government.  In agreeing to the new constitutional 
arrangements (Pakistan’s first constitution was introduced in March 1956), which 
included parity in the National Assembly despite their marked superiority due to 
population size, many East Pakistanis maintained that this should also entail parity in 
terms of appointments between East and West in central Government posts.  Under 
these circumstances, it is noteworthy that an East Pakistani had been appointed as 
soon as a Sessions judgeship was created in Karachi, while a new Bengali District 
Magistrate had also just been posted to the city, and other recent appointments to 
senior police posts there had similarly been filled from East Pakistan.  In January 
1956, the then (Bengali) Minister for Labour, Nurul Haq Chaudhry (the same person 
who later in July would lead the surprise raid on the CID offices and let it be known 
that a telephone tapping system had been discovered), had strongly urged Grace to 
give what the latter termed ‘due representation’ in the lower ranks of the Karachi 
Police to East Pakistanis in particular.  By May 1957, a growing proportion of the 
higher appointments in the Karachi police (Inspector-General, Head of CID and 
Divisions) were held by Bengalis, with many superior Punjabi officers having been 
transferred to other posts.   
 More generally, however, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali’s growing distance from 
his own sources of political support, namely the Muslim League in coalition with the 
United Front, combined with challenges being mounted by Hussain Shaheed 
Suhrawardi’s Awami League and the newly-formed Republican Party headed by Dr 
Khan Sahib, meant that his position as Prime Minister, despite continued backing 
from President Iskander Mirza,52 had deteriorated badly by the summer of 1956.   His 
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  According to one British report, even as late as August Iskander renewed his pledge 
to Chaudhry Muhammad Ali that “we should sink or swim together”, but also told him “that 
doesn’t mean you should make no attempt to save yourself from sinking”.  He would continue 
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government’s failure to solve recent political crises in both East and West Pakistan 
further compounded the challenges that he now faced. Dogged by ill health and 
inconvenienced by foreign trips, he proved himself to be manifestly unsuccessful at 
coping with the fact that, as events between May and August that year underlined, his 
coalition government’s composition (which had come into power the previous year, 
and to which Pakistan owed the One Unit Act and its new Constitution) no longer 
reflected the true division of political support in the country.53  Rumours that he was 
intending to leave the Muslim League in order to form a new party of his own proved 
hard to quash.54  Under these circumstances, dissatisfied Muslim Leaguers relished 
the opportunity provided by the police-related disturbances in Karachi to undermine 
the Prime Minister’s fading authority. Likewise, there was no love lost between him 
and a growing proportion of politicians from East Pakistan where the proroguing of 
the Provincial Assembly in mid-August that year provided further grist to their mill 
when it came to problems with how political power in Pakistan was being shared and 
managed.55  Hence, in this jostling for political advantage, an alleged alliance 
between UP and Bengali politicians, equally keen to protect their particular interests, 
was blamed for (or credited with) exploiting every possible opportunity to embarrass 
the Prime Minister as well as the President, and, if possible, engineer their collective 
downfall.  With a growing proportion of his former supporters now lining up against 
him, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali’s position was eventually rendered unsustainable.  
Before resigning in September, however, he did remove from their posts the Interior 
Secretary and his Deputy, Karachi’s Chief Commissioner and District Magistrate, and 
many others deemed responsible for the plot against the Karachi Police, but these 
actions – from his point of view and that of Grace also - came too late.   
 There was an inevitable postscript to the events of 1956.  In 1957 charges that 
Grace had caused false statements to be made and had wrongfully detained certain 
people were brought against him in Karachi’s City Court, a move that might have 
                                                                                                                                            
to support the Prime Minister, weak though he might be, because he was the best man 
available.  See ‘Pakistan Political Situation’, 17 August 1956, DO 35 5407, UKNA. 
53
  As far as the West Pakistan element in the National Assembly was concerned, the 
Muslim League, which had held at least 28 of the 38 West Pakistan seats, declined in strength 
to 13 or 14.  At the same time, the Republican Party had built itself up from nothing to a 
strength of 21 or 22 seats, while the United Front, which held 22 out of the 39 East Pakistan 
seats, could no longer count on even this bare majority. ‘Pakistan:  internal political situation’, 
2 August 1956, DO 35/5407, UKNA. 
54
  The Times, 17 August 1956. 
55
  Pakistan Fortnightly Summary, Part II, 17-30 August 1956, DO 35/5285, UKNA. 
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resulted in him being summoned back to Pakistan to stand trial.56  That this never 
transpired was much to the former Inspector-General's relief.  Meanwhile, those 
accused in the Noor Muhammad Memon murder case were eventually acquitted by 
the Sessions Judge, Tharparkar District, on August 1957, his judgement declaring that 
the prosecution had failed miserably to frame the case against the accused.  The 
matter, however, was not allowed to rest there:  Dawn, for one, announced that an 
appeal against the decision would be filed before the West Pakistan High Court, 
Karachi Bench, and the legal saga continued for some further time before finally 
running out of steam. 57 
 
Conclusion 
 
This tale of conspiracy and possible (or perhaps likely) dishonesty within the ranks of 
the police and the wider administration in Karachi highlights how far the 
circumstances of the post-partition years encouraged an environment to emerge in 
which malpractice if not corruption could thrive within an institution such as the 
police, riven as it was by provincial rivalries.  Equally, it tells us something about the 
nature of the interface between the everyday representatives of the new state and lives 
of the ordinary citizens who had made the city of Karachi their home, demonstrating 
just how important personal connections were for protecting or enhancing people’s 
interests in the context of Pakistan’s early years.  Either way, what the tangled events 
described above underline is the intricate web of interests that were competing for 
advantage – political, personal or otherwise – in the years following independence 
and partition, and in which an individual’s background and connections represented a 
crucial part of the equation.58  Karachi had become a melting pot thanks to the 
demographic consequences of partition.  But while the state’s new citizens may have 
become Pakistanis at independence, their pre-1947 loyalties tended not to be shed, or 
jettisoned, in the process.  If anything, the spoils now on offer in a new state 
                                                 
56
  ‘Grace, Iqbal Shah and others challaned:  accused charged with many criminal acts’, 
Dawn, 25 July 1957.  This case involved the treatment of a refugee woman Akhtari Begum 
arrested as part of a round-up of prostitutes and their pimps made significant by the 
involvement of some highly-placed politicians and officials, and taken up by the pro-refugee 
newspaper Dawn as a cause celebre.  
57
  R.W.D. Fowler, United Kingdom High Commission Karachi, to Sir G. Grace, 
London, 26 August 1957, DO 35/8932, UKNA. 
58
  ‘For the Information of the President of Pakistan only’, p. 1..  
  
23 
 
 
reinforced existing connections as different groups actively jostled for access to and 
control over new sources of power and influence.  The city, flooded as it was with 
migrants both from India and from other parts of Pakistan, all in search of a secure 
footing in unfamiliar surroundings, witnessed high levels of competition for scarce 
resources – a scramble which, as this particular case study has demonstrated, could 
involve police officers and government servants (and politicians) belonging to the 
same pre-1947 backgrounds working together to enhance their (individual and 
collective) interests.  As Sir Gilbert Grace found out to his own cost, Pakistanis – 
whether migrants from UP, Bengalis or ‘up-country’ Punjabis – had quickly worked 
out that what mattered in 1950s Karachi was where you came from and who you 
knew, for in practice this appeared the only effective way of getting things done, 
whether in terms of sorting out problems or making the most of available 
opportunities. 
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